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ABSTRACT 
 With the 2010 release of Vision 2021, the government’s comprehensive societal 
and economic vision for the future, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) laid out a path to 
diversify its economy. This plan moves the UAE away from resource dependence to a 
knowledge-based economy less reliant on natural resources and physical labor. This 
thesis explores the economic history of the United Arab Emirates, its previous 
diversification efforts, and its proposed way forward with Vision 2021. The author 
evaluates progress made up to this point using economic data and key performance 
indicators outlined in Vision 2021. This evaluation shows that although the UAE has 
made significant investment into diversification efforts, there has not yet been the 
expected return on investment. In order to fulfill the plan’s aspirations, the UAE will 
need to make significant strides over the next two years. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has worked toward diversifying their economy
since the founding of the country in 1971. In 2010, the UAE released Vision 2021, a 
document that laid out a strategy of economic and social improvement leading up to the 
nation’s Golden Jubilee 50th anniversary. What are the economic diversification strategies 
and goals of the UAE laid out in Vision 2021? Have implemented policies been effective 
and what progress has been made toward the goals of Vision 2021? This thesis will study 
the UAE’s diversification plans and goals and compare it with published data to assess the 
progress of diversification efforts in the UAE. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION
Since its establishment in the 1970s, the UAE has relied on its oil exports to provide
the overwhelming majority of government revenue. UAE government officials recognized 
early on that diversification of the economy would be necessary in order to maintain the 
levels of government expenditures and public services that oil money provided.1 This has 
become increasingly important as oil prices have stabilized at low levels and other regional 
countries look to diversify as well. While modernization and diversification efforts have 
been ongoing for decades, diversification efforts have increased in the last twenty years. 
When the UAE was founded in 1971, its economy relied primarily on its newly 
developed oil fields to fuel its economic growth. The sudden increase in oil prices in 1973 
allowed for significant investment in infrastructure and government services.2 In 1975, oil 
revenues accounted for over 67% of national gross domestic product (GDP), with no other 
sector accounting for even double digits.3 This reliance on oil revenues was successful, as 
1 Radwa Radwan Said, “UAE Economic Diversification Record,” TRENDS Research and Advisory, 
June 14, 2016, http://trendsinstitution.org/uae-economic-diversification-record/. 
2 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Post-Rentier Economic Challenges,” India Quarterly: A Journal of 
International Affairs 73, no. 2 (June 2017): 210–26, https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928417700800. 
3 Mohamed Shihab, “Economic Development in the UAE,” in United Arab Emirates: A New 
Perspective, ed. Ibrahim Abed and Peter Hellyer, 2001, 249–59. 
2 
UAE annual GDP rose from under $20 billion in 1972 to over $90 billion in the early 
2000s.4 UAE leaders recognized early the need to diversify the economy and initially 
worked to expand the manufacturing, trade, and financial services sectors. In the late 1970s, 
projects focused on manufacturing plants and import/export infrastructure, while by the 
late 1980s and early 1990s the UAE began to open financial centers and security 
exchanges.5  
As the UAE has worked to diversify its economy, it has relied on importing workers 
from abroad to staff positions in both the skilled and unskilled sectors. Following the early 
oil boom international corporations imported workers, managers, and professionals to cope 
with the growing demands placed on oil exploration and infrastructure development.6 This 
has led to foreigners accounting for 91% of the UAE labor market.7 According to Jasim 
Al-Ali, Emirati’s views on employment focus on avoiding manual labor and are gearing 
toward higher skilled and modern sectors when working in the private sector. This is 
another reason for the need to develop and diversify the economy, to provide jobs for the 
Emirati workforce and decrease dependence on foreign labor. 
A decrease in oil prices in 2014 forced members of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), including the UAE, to redouble their efforts to decrease dependence on oil exports 
as a source of revenue and look to other sources of economic growth. The emergence of 
shale oil extraction technology and a decrease in demand depressed the price of oil in 2014 
and economists forecast that oil prices will likely remain stagnant for the foreseeable 
future.8 Different members of the GCC have developed their own plans on how to adjust 
to this new reality, but all are looking to diversify their economy in order to prepare for the 
                                                 
4 Michael C Ewers, “Oil, Human Capital and Diversification: The Challenge of Transition in the UAE 
and the Arab Gulf States,” Geographical Journal 182, no. 3 (September 2016): 236–50, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12138. 
5 Said, “UAE Economic Diversification Record.” 
6 Jasim Al‐Ali, “Emiratization: Drawing UAE Nationals into Their Surging Economy,” International 
Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 28, no. 9/10 (September 5, 2008): 365–79, 
https://doi.org/10.1108/01443330810900202. 3. 
7 Jasim Al‐Ali, 4. 
8 Keith Breene, “Why Are Oil Prices so Low?” World Economic Forum, May 3, 2016, 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/why-are-oil-prices-so-low/. 
3 
future and continue their economic growth and improvements in quality of life. For 
example, Qatar has Vision 2030, which seeks to maintain growth and move away from 
reliance on oil revenues.9 Other examples include Saudi Arabia’s long-term strategy 2025, 
Vision 2020 in Oman, and Vision 2030 in Bahrain.10 Economic competition will continue 
between the various GCC countries and the country that can best diversify will be in the 
position for success in the future. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The modernization and growth of economies from traditional to modern is one of 
the main areas of studies in the area of economics. One of the most well regarded theories 
of economic growth that has been applied to numerous economies throughout history is 
the five stages of growth outlined by W.W. Rostow. Rostow’s stages of traditional society, 
transitional society, take-off, drive to technological maturity, and high mass consumption, 
trace an economy’s development as it increases resources and gradually expands.11 
Traditionally this model shows a gradually industrializing economy with diverse sectors 
emerging behind the breakthroughs of a few “take-off” sectors. Rostow’s work has been 
criticized as being historical and selectively applied, but provides a general template for 
economic development.12 
Economies based primarily on natural resources do not traditionally follow a 
normal pattern of development. In fact, countries with rich natural wealth often progress 
slower than countries that do not possess such reserves due to resource dependence and 
could actually experience a net economic loss.13 This phenomenon is commonly known as 
                                                 
9 General Secretariat for Development Planning, “Qatari National Vision 2030,” Ministry of 
Development Planning and Statistics, July 2008, 
https://www.mdps.gov.qa/en/qnv/Documents/QNV2030_English_v2.pdf. 
10 Tim Callen et al., Economic Diversification in the GCC: Past, Present, and Future (Washington, 
DC: International Monetary Fund, 2014). 
11 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
12 Yoichi Itagaki, “Criticism of Rostow’s Stage Approach: The Concepts of Stage, System and Type,” 
Developing Economies 1, no. 1 (1963): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1963.tb01138.x. 
13 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “The Curse of Natural Resources,” European Economic 
Review 45, no. 4–6 (May 2001): 827–38. 
4 
the resource curse, also sometimes referred to as “Dutch Disease.”14 Economic researchers 
have conducted various empirical studies of economic data and found a strong support for 
the idea.15 Some posit that the reason for the poor economic growth of resource rich 
countries is the inability to apply what is learned from resource production to other 
industries.16 Others write that the volatility of commodity prices, especially oil, leave 
countries unable to plan for the future and price dips can have a significant negative effect 
on the entire economy.17 Some attribute lack of growth in resource rich countries is due to 
an allocation state model of governance that relies of wealth distribution and migrant labor 
that does not develop human capital or alternative productive sectors.18  
In order to avoid the resource curse, countries are encouraged to diversify their 
economies beyond the primary resource sector. It has been shown that diverse economies 
are more stable and perform better over the long term.19 This long-term strategic goal of 
stability is supplemented by other goals of diversification. Some write that wider 
                                                 
14 Ajit V. Karnik and Cedwyn Fernandes, “Natural Resource Dependence: A Macroeconometric Model 
for the United Arab Emirates,” Applied Economics 41, no. 9 (April 10, 2009): 1157–74, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00036840601019109. 
15 R. M. Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (London: 
Routledge, 1993); Alan H. Gelb, Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse?, A World Bank Research Publication 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Rebeca Jiménez-Rodríguez and Marcelo Sánchez, “Oil Price 
Shocks and Real GDP Growth: Empirical Evidence for Some OECD Countries,” Applied Economics 37, 
no. 2 (2005): 201–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/0003684042000281561. 
16 Ricardo Hausman, Bailey Klinger, and Jose Lopez-Caliz, “Export Diversification in Algeria,” in 
Trade Competitiveness of the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Jose Lopez-Caliz, Peter Walkenhorst, and 
Ndiame Diop (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), 63–102. 
17 Alan Gelb, “Economic Diversification in Resource-Rich Countries,” in Beyond the Curse: Policies 
to Harness the Power of Natural Resources, ed. Rabah Arezki, Thorvaldur Gylfason, and Amadou N. R. Sy 
(Washington, DC.: International Monetary Fund, 2011), 55–80; James D Hamilton, “Understanding Crude 
Oil Prices,” The Energy Journal 30, no. 2 (2009): 179–206. 
18 Heiko Hesse, “Export Diversification and Economic Growth,” Breaking into New Markets, 2009, 
55–80; Martin Hvidt, Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future Trends 
(London School of Economics and Political Science, 2013). 
19 Hesse, “Export Diversification and Economic Growth”; Daniel Lederman and William F. Maloney, 
eds., Natural Resources, Neither Curse nor Destiny, Latin America Development Forum (Palo Alto, CA : 
Washington, DC: Stanford Economics and Finance, an imprint of Stanford University Press ; World Bank, 
2007); General Secretariat for Development Planning, Qatar National Development Strategy 2011–2016 
(Doha: GSDP, 2011); H. El Beblawi, “Gulf Industrialization in Perspective,” in Industrialization in the 
Gulf: A Socioeconomic Revolution (London: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown 
University/Routledge, 2011), 185–97. 
5 
employment in labor rich countries is a reason for additional sectors of the economy.20  
Others say that decreased volatility is a primary reason to diversify.21 It is also argued that 
decreased dependence on external asset funds and foreign exchange is another strategic 
reason to diversify.22 
No matter the reasons for diversification, the process of adding new sectors to an 
economy requires both human and institutional capital. It has been shown that countries 
that invest heavily in human capital through education and training are able to avoid the 
negative effects of the resource curse.23 Studies have also indicated that the presence of 
strong institutions that are able to manage resources will be more effective in 
diversification efforts.24 Economic diversification efforts that focus on building human 
capital and strengthening institutional capital are much more likely to succeed. Any effort 
at assessing diversification efforts can use these factors as an indicator for probable 
success. 
Although much has been written on the resource curse, the need for diversification 
and the elements that are needed for diversification to succeed, the literature on specific 
efforts of diversification in the UAE is not as large. Older volumes focus on the Gulf and 
                                                 
20 Hausman, Klinger, and Lopez-Caliz, “Export Diversification in Algeria.” 
21 Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the 
Middle East, 2nd ed, The Contemporary Middle East (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Paul 
Rivlin, Arab Economies in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009). 
22 Gelb, “Economic Diversification in Resource-Rich Countries.” 
23 Claudio Bravo-Ortega and Jose Gregorio, “The Relative Richness of the Poor?: Natural Resources, 
Human Capital and Economic Growth,” Policy Research Working Paper Series (The World Bank, 2005); 
Lederman and Maloney, Natural Resources, Neither Curse nor Destiny; Daniele Schilirò, “Diversification 
and Development of the United Arab Emirates’ Economy,” Journal of Applied Economic Sciences vol. 8, 
(August 2013): 228–239. 
24 Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik, “Institutions and the Resource Curse,” The 
Economic Journal 116, no. 508 (January 2006): 1–20; Paul. Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest 
Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
6 
Arab economies as a whole with a large focus on the utilization of oil revenue.25 The UAE 
is a relatively new country and its push toward a diverse, knowledge-based economy 
moving away from oil is even newer. Many studies of Gulf State’s diversification efforts 
also focus on the area as whole with minimal focus on individual economies.26 Authors 
focusing on the UAE specifically have conducted useful empirical studies as well as 
broader discussion of diversification efforts.27 Many of these volumes however cover pre-
2000 timeframes and focus on the initial diversification efforts after the formation of the 
country.28 This thesis will add to these works with a focus on current UAE diversification 
strategy and its effectiveness. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Economic diversification efforts have been ongoing in the UAE for a number of 
years. At first glance, it would seem that they have been successful in bringing in new 
economic sectors including finance and tourism to decrease the government’s dependence 
on oil. Oil revenues have been utilized to create infrastructure to enable these new sectors 
as well as become a shipping and transport hub. However, it has been demonstrated that 
the keys to successful diversification efforts lie in the development of human capital and 
the strengthening of institutions.  
                                                 
25 Robert E. Looney, Industrial Development and Diversification of the Arabian Gulf Economies, 
Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, v. 70 (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1994); 
Giacomo Luciani, ed., The Arab State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Mohamed A. 
Ramady, The GCC Economies Stepping Up To Future Challenges (New York, NY: Springer New York, 
2012), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-1611-1; Melani Claire Cammett, Ishac Diwan, and Alan 
Richards, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2015). 
26 Hvidt, Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future Trends; Callen et al., 
Economic Diversification in the GCC; Samer Bohsali, Per-Ola Karlsson, and Rawia Abdel Samad, 
“Economic Diversification in the Gulf,” Forbes, accessed October 27, 2017, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/strategyand/2016/09/27/economic-diversification-in-the-gulf/. 
27 Karnik and Fernandes, “Natural Resource Dependence”; Schilirò, “Diversification and Development 
of the United Arab Emirates’ Economy”; Said, “UAE Economic Diversification Record.” 
28 Malcolm C. Peck, The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity, Profiles (Boulder, Colo. : London: 
Westview Press ; Croom Helm, 1986); K. G. Fenelon, The United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social 
Survey (London: Longman, 1973); Al-Shamsi Fatima, “Industrial Strategies and Changes in the UAE 
during the 1980s,” in Change and Development in the Gulf, ed. Abbas Abdekarim (London: Macmillan, 
1999). 
7 
Effort has been made to increase education and create a knowledge-based 
indigenous workforce. The effectiveness of those efforts is yet to be seen and foreign 
workers take a large number of jobs in the newly created sectors. Studying the outcomes 
of educational reforms and seeing if of high-skilled jobs are being filled by native workers 
will help to confirm whether the goal of a knowledge-based economy is being met.  
The building of institutions seems to be an area where the UAE has been successful 
to this point. The government has worked to create an environment that is business friendly 
and has a level of trustworthiness that attracts outside capital. Further study of the change 
in foreign capital and transactions will provide a basis to judge how well institutional 
capital is being built. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will examine the plans and policies outlined by the government of the 
UAE to understand their diversification strategy and goals. UAE Vision 2021 was launched 
in 2010 with the goal of making the UAE one of the most advanced nations in the world in 
preparation for the 50th anniversary of the country’s founding.29 Each section of the plan 
outlines a broad strategy to achieve their objectives as well as key performance indicators 
(KPI) as a way to track progress. This thesis will study the economic section to understand 
diversification efforts as well as the education section to gauge the improvement of human 
capital. Individual Emirates have also created their own plans and performance 
benchmarks.30 This thesis will supplement the UAE Vision 2021 with those plans to give 
a more complete picture of the overall diversification strategy. 
In order to gauge the success of the UAE’s strategy, indicators such as overall GDP 
growth, non-oil GDP growth, ranking in the Global Innovation Index (GII), and ranking in 
the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) will be used. Vision 2021 does not lay out specific 
                                                 
29 “UAE Vision 2021,” UAE 2021 Executive Council, accessed October 26, 2017, 
https://www.vision2021.ae/en/our-vision. 
30 “Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030,” Abu Dhabi Executive Council, The Official Portal of the UAE 
Government, October 27, 2017, 
https://www.abudhabi.ae/cs/groups/public/documents/publication/~edisp/adegp_nd_131654_en.pdf; Dubai 
Planning Council, “Dubai Strategic Plan 2015,” Arab Rule of Law, accessed November 17, 2017, 
http://www.arabruleoflaw.org/compendium/Files/UAE/94.pdf. 
8 
goals for their key performance indicators, but by looking at goals laid out in plans of the 
individual Emirates, an approximate goal can be established. This paper will utilize GDP 
growth and non-oil GDP growth rate goals for Abu Dhabi’s vision 2030 and Dubai’s 
Strategic Plan 2015 as benchmarks. Although goals for individual Emirates may differ 
slightly from the UAE as a whole, they are a useful approximation. In order to assess 
success in the GII and GCI rankings, we will look for relative improvement as well as 
comparative rankings with other GCC countries that are competing with the UAE in 
diversifying away from oil-based economies. Data will be taken from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the publishers of the GII and GCI rankings. Other 
data sets or benchmarks will be utilized if discovered to be useful in the course of research. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
The thesis will be structured with an introduction and background covering the 
development of the UAE, its economic history and reliance on the oil sector, and its unique 
form of governance. The third chapter will discuss the UAE’s current diversification 
efforts. It will cover Vision 2021, the specific Emirates’ plans, as well as the programs and 
policies that the government has instituted in attempt to accomplish the vision. This chapter 
will focus on economic investment, policy changes, as well as efforts to increase human 
capital. The fourth chapter will be a discussion of the benchmarks utilized to measure 
success and a discussion of where the UAE currently stands in relation to those 
benchmarks. The thesis will conclude with an assessment of diversification efforts to this 
point and a discussion of where there has been success or failure. 
9 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EARLY 
DIVERSIFICATION EFFORTS 
A. TRADITIONAL ECONOMY 
The traditional economy of the UAE for most of the 18th and 19th century included 
animal husbandry, hunting, fishing, sailing, cultivation of dates, and pearling. The scarce 
resources of the desert dictated they types of economic activities that were available. The 
mountain areas and occasional oases provided for the cultivation of dates and other small 
agriculture while the presence of camels and gazelles allowed for limited hunting and 
herding.31 However, pearl diving became the region’s primary activity as the value of 
pearls on the international market made the trade more lucrative. As the pearling industry 
grew smaller industries began to emerge to support the increased activity and population 
that the came along with the growth.32 These cottage industries included boat building, 
rope making, and weaving and marked the beginning of expansion of economic 
opportunity. 
The pearling industry took on a capitalist form as demand grew and moved away 
from the traditional small crew structure that was merely self-sustaining. Early pearling 
crews jointly owned boats and distributed profits among the crew depending on the work 
each member performed.33 As the industry grew, the size and cost of boats also increased, 
soon making it difficult for a crew to afford their own vessel. Wealthier individuals began 
to own the boats, taking a share of the profits and hiring crewmen as salaried labor instead 
of treating them as partial owners. This new division of capital created distinct classes of 
investors and salaried crewmembers.34 By the 1930s, the competition from cultured pearls 
and the worldwide economic downturn lead to a sharp decline in the profitability of the 
                                                 
31 Christopher Davidson, “The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival” (PhD, University of St 
Andrews, 2003), 16. 
32 Frauke Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition, 3rd ed. 
(London: Longman, 1999), 11. 
33 Davidson, “The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival,” 14. 
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pearling trade and its associated small industries.35 As pearling declined, many of the 
wealthy pearl boat owners and others involved in the trade were reluctant to diversify their 
holdings. Pearling was seen as not just an occupation, but as an honorable and traditional 
way of life.36 This failure to diversify led to the downfall of many in the pearling class and 
served as an early lesson and warning for those who would later come into their fortunes 
in the resource based oil economy. 
In addition to pearling, the gulf provided opportunity for limited regional and 
international trade as another source of income. Trade was primarily in simple 
commodities, but there was also significant trade in slaves and gold. Slaves were brought 
from East Africa and sold to the interior of the Arabian Peninsula. Later, as British 
influence increased, slaving was eliminated but gold continued to be an important trading 
commodity until the late twentieth century.37 Over time, trading vessels grew in size and 
required deeper ports. The geography of the coastal towns, reefs, and islands made it 
impossible to accommodate the newer ships and overseas trade subsequently declined.38 
B. TRADITIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
Before significant British influence and the explosion of the pearling industry, the 
primary social and political structure in the lower gulf was that of a nomadic lifestyle and 
tribal society. Animal husbandry was the traditional occupation of the nomadic tribes, with 
sheep and camel herding being prevalent. Camel herding was the more lucrative of the two, 
and over time, the camel herders took a position of prominence over the sheepherders.39 
These tribes maintained their power by social exclusion and inter-marriage, creating a 
society dominated by a few powerful families that competed for influence. 
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The tribes gradually moved toward the coasts and would seasonally fish or dive for 
pearls before returning to tend to their herds in the winter.40 As the pearling trade exploded, 
tribesmen could afford to invest in the industry and build houses in the coastal towns.41 
The wealthier camel herders were the tribes with excess capital to invest into the new 
pearling boom. This disparity of investment essentially transferred the old desert economic 
and social stratification to the pearling trade, leaving the same powerful tribes with political 
control.  
Foreigners were also increasingly attracted to the area due to the lucrative nature of 
pearling. The majority of foreigners were temporary crewmen; however, some began to 
take up semi-permanent residence as merchants, returning to their homes only 
periodically.42 Many local Arabs avoided retail and shop keeping and instead limited 
themselves to the honorable activities of pearling or dhow trading.43 This left a void filled 
by foreigners and serves as an early parallel to the current labor market in the UAE, where 
foreign workers constitute a majority in many sectors where Arabs avoid working.44 
The political structure of the tribes and nomads was dependent on authority over 
people, as opposed to controlling vast swaths of land.45 Rulers could hold influence over 
groups that were geographically distant through personal authority. One way of 
maintaining this authority was through subsidizing the population through gifts or paying 
for protection.46 Tribes located close to one another could find themselves loyal to different 
rulers, making it difficult to consolidate power and forma a unified political entity.47 This 
phenomenon can still be seen by looking at modern maps of the area surrounding the UAE, 
with pockets of territory, such as the Musandam Peninsula, falling well within the 
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boundaries of neighboring states.48 These pockets represent the loyalty and authority 
cultivated over time by tribal rulers. 
The rulers, or sheikhs, of these groups utilized a form of institutions to administer 
their authority amongst the people they ruled. Two of the primary institutions were the 
majlis and the diwan. The majlis was a system where the people could air their grievances 
directly to the ruler for resolution in an early form of democratic expression.49 The diwan 
consisted of a council of the rulers’ advisors, primarily dominated by the sheikh’s family.50 
Each of these advisors represented a different segment of society and provided advice to 
the sheikh and a form of legitimacy in the areas of society that the members represented. 
In addition, the sheikh appointed judges to run courts and tribunals and regional 
representatives were assigned to carry out the sheikh’s wishes and administer in farther 
flung territories. 
C. EXTERNAL INFLUENCE 
Increasing influence from the outside world led to changes in the social, economic, 
and political structures of the area that comprises the UAE. The earliest outsiders from 
Europe were the Portuguese, who were interested in the lower gulf to secure the trade routes 
between Europe and the East Indies. The Portuguese thought that they would need to 
control the Straits of Hormuz in order to secure the maritime route around the Cape of 
Good Hope all the way to the East Indies.51 Due to the lack of natural harbors and 
geographic factors, the Portuguese did not establish significant settlements in the area. This 
lack of permanent presence meant that the earliest outsiders had little effect on the social 
and political structures of the area; however, it did attract the attention of other Portuguese 
rivals and brought them to the area.52 One lasting impact left by the Portuguese came from 
their practice of executing entire communities in order to secure harbors. The memory of 
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these atrocities had the effect of creating an enduring sense of distrust of dealing with 
outsiders.53 
The largest and longest lasting external influence on the region was the British. The 
British had sporadic contact with the region due to its maritime trading routes through the 
region; however, the early influence was minimal. The first major conflict with the British 
resulted from a trading dispute between the Qasimi tribes and the British East India 
Company. The Qasimi, based in the coastal area of Ras Al Khaimah, had established a new 
trading post on the island of Qishm and the East India Company sent an armed force to 
extract what they felt should be their share of customs.54 This marked the beginning of a 
protracted conflict between the two, with the Qasimi attacking in self-proclaimed defense 
of their territory and interests and the East India Company branding the Qasimi as pirates 
and thieves. 
Following the eventual British defeat of the Qasimi pirates, the British government 
operating out of Bombay sent Captain Perronet Thompson to negotiate individual treaties 
with the ruling sheikhs of the region in order to establish a safer and more reliable route of 
trade in the region.55 These series of treaties, or truces, gave rise to the term “Trucial States” 
and led to relative maritime peace in the region. The signing and renewing of treaties 
continued, culminating in an 1853 Perpetual Treaty of Peace. This treaty encompassed 
most of the ruling families of the time and provided them with enough economic benefit to 
ensure cooperation on both sides.56 
The agreements between the British and ruling sheikhs began to impact the 
traditional political structure of the region. The British became more involved in local 
administration and dispute resolution and formally recognized only the signatories of the 
Perpetual Treaty. This had the effect of delegitimizing other sheikhs that would have been 
able to compete for power and influence in the traditional tribal structure. Britain also 
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began to screen rulers to ensure that they would be amenable to British desires and would 
likely adhere to the status quo.57 In this way, the fluid rise and fall of local leaders that had 
existed in the traditional system was frozen in time at the signing of the treaty, and created 
permanent boundaries of influence that had changed based on the ebb and flow of people 
and influence.58 It also further tipped the balance of power toward coastal tribes that dealt 
directly with the British, allowing them to control ever-increasing portions of the interior 
land.59 
The British continued to increase their influence over the economic and political 
environment of the area, attempting to exclude any other foreign power and increase the 
dependency of local rulers. By the early twentieth century, the British had instituted 
agreements that prevented local rulers from granting any type of pearling concessions 
without first consulting with the British Political Resident.60 Additional reliance on Britain 
began when some rulers began receiving income by providing landing rights for military 
and eventually civilian aircraft on their route from Britain to India.61 This dependence on 
air rights payments was another example of ruling sheikhs earning based on external rents, 
which would only increase with the discovery of oil in the region. 
The British also exerted significant influence over the economic development that 
would prove most transformative for the region; oil. In 1922, the region’s rulers agreed to 
consider only oil concessions approved by the British.62 In 1935, the British Political 
Resident bound the sheikhs to deal only with Petroleum Concessions Ltd, a subsidiary of 
the London-based Iraqi Petroleum Company. Petroleum Concessions thus became the only 
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company operating oil concessions in the lower gulf.63 This agreement further entrenched 
the regions’ leaders’ dependence on economic rent. 
Following World War II, Britain looked to improve regional security while 
reducing the cost of British presence in the region. In order to achieve this increased 
security, Britain looked to engender greater regional unity and worked to establish and 
develop the region’s administrative and government institutions. As a result of this effort, 
the Trucial States Council was formed to bring prominent rulers together as an advisory 
body.64 The Council continued to evolve and expand its areas of influence, with continued 
input and oversight by British political agents and representatives from British oil 
companies.65 As oil revenue increased, the council became financially independent and 
implemented many development projects in transportation, education, and healthcare. 
Eventually Britain announced that it would be withdrawing its forces from the area in 1971, 
leaving the Trucial States to operate on their own. 
The forming of a federation of the Trucial States was seen as a natural progression 
for the Trucial States Council, since it had already been performing many of the 
administrative and development functions alongside the British. The British worked to 
allow the Council to make decisions on their own and gain as much experience as possible 
before the withdrawal. The negotiations between the leaders of the council to form the 
federation were heated at times, eventually leading Qatar and Bahrain to drop out of the 
federation altogether. Despite the rocky period of formation, the United Arab Emirates 
came into being on December 2, 1971, with the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed, as the 
first president. The emirates of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain and 
Fujairah were the initial members, with Ras Al Khaimah joining in 1972.66 
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D. EARLY DIVERSIFICATION EFFORTS 
By the time the UAE was established, its rulers already recognized the need to 
diversify the economy in order to build a sustainable federation. In an early 1980s study of 
Arab economies, Samir Amin identified several problems already appearing in economies 
dependent on oil. These problems were the external orientation of most Arab countries, 
weak industrialization, technological dependency, and increased dependence on the west, 
which was masked by the illusion of wealth created by oil.67 In order to combat these 
issues, economic planners in the UAE began to attempt to reverse dependency related 
features of the economy in addition to seeking growth. The main  problems seen by the 
planners were similar to those observed by Amin in the wider Arab world; reliance on a 
single export, reliance on foreign technology, an imbalanced international work force, and 
its relationship with oil purchasing economies.68 The fear was that dependency on oil rents 
would result in a consumerist society and an indigenous labor market reliant on foreign 
workers and government subsidies. 
1. Savings and Investment 
In order to combat these problems, the UAE undertook a series of steps to reduce 
their reliance on oil income. The easiest solution was to save and invest the vast amounts 
of excess capital that was flowing into the federation and rely on the interest payments and 
appreciation of assets. These investments were made in various overseas markets and by 
the end of 1999; the reported foreign reserves had reached over $100 billion.69 However, 
overseas investment of oil profits was recognized as only a partial solution to the problem 
of dependence and other more fundamental measures were required to diversify the 
economy. 
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2. Industrialization 
Industrialization has long been seen as a key component to diversification in any 
economy. In fact, in some literature on diversification the terms are interchangeable, as it 
is seen that industrialization will naturally result in a more diverse economy.70 By 1979, 
the UAE had passed an industrial law that outlined the objectives of the diversification 
effort. These objectives were to establish a productive manufacturing base, prioritize the 
manufacturing sector to create production linkages, utilize industrialization as a way to 
provide foreign exchange, and to use the comparative advantage of low cost energy to 
make UAE industries competitive.71 
Strategies for industrialization at the time included export oriented industrialization 
(EOI) and import substitution industrialization (ISI). EOI was seen as a way to industrialize 
rapidly and would take advantage of the UAE’s energy advantage. This rapid growth, 
however, would come at the cost of a continued reliance on foreign technology. ISI is 
utilized in many developing countries to use imported technology as a temporary measure 
until local technology can be developed to replace it. In his early 1970s study of Arab 
economies, Fenelon identified a third industrial sector consisting of small, traditional 
handicrafts manufactured solely for the local market.72 
EOI efforts in the UAE is best exemplified by the harnessing of natural gas that had 
previously been largely flared off as a side product of oil drilling. Major gas plants were 
built on Das Island, Al-Ruways, and Dubai and produced significant volume for the export 
market.73 Development in the gas sector has continued, with regional partnerships and the 
establishment of major transportation hubs for gas export. These developments, which are 
part of the oil industry, serve to diversify, however they do not solve the problem of 
dependence on oil as a resource.74 Other heavy industries, such as aluminum, steel, and 
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plastics have taken advantage of cheap energy to expand and see success. For example, by 
2000 aluminum exports accounted for nearly 60% of Dubai’s non-oil exports.75  
The ISI industrialization effort has not been as successful as the EOI projects 
without the advantage of capitalizing on available cheap energy. However, by the late 
1970s a number of small and medium scale manufactures were seeing success and 
producing goods for the domestic market.76 Particular success was seen in the production 
of construction materials such as cement and pipes. These materials are bulky and costly 
to import, giving advantage to local producers. ISI projects continued into the 1980s and 
1990s with projects in bottling and packaging seeing successful local substitution of 
foreign technology.77 
3. Agriculture 
The development of the agricultural sector was another key part of the UAE’s early 
diversification efforts. The UAE traditionally had a small agricultural industry in dates and 
fishing, but due to the climate and arid land, the UAE was largely dependent on importation 
of foreign food. In order to reduce this dependency, early plans called for the need to 
increase agricultural production through both increased yield on existing agricultural land 
as well as working to increase the available cultivatable land. The agricultural sector was 
also seen as important to the growth of the local economy because agriculture employed a 
higher percentage of UAE nationals than any other sector.78 
The UAE has made significant investment through generous subsidies to increase 
the efficiency and production of agricultural lands. These subsidies are utilized to purchase 
modern farming equipment, build irrigation and water wells, and research new crops that 
can flourish in the harsh climate.79 In order to increase the amount of arable land the 
government has invested significant sums in afforestation. The goals of the massive 
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planting of trees is the reduction of erosion, protection of crops, and the possibility of 
increased rainfall in desert regions.80 The efforts to increase productivity of existing lands 
has seen large increases in agricultural output and has served to reduce dependency on 
imported food. Efforts to increase arable land have been less successful, especially 
considering the massive expenditures that have been necessary to implement the programs.  
4. Commerce and Tourism 
Another area seen as important for building up non-oil related activity and reducing 
reliance on foreign labor and technology is the commerce and tourism sectors. Tourism 
also has the added advantage of promoting traditional local industries and increase the 
social and cultural activities in the region.81 Although not reliant on foreign labor expertise 
or technology, the tourism sector does maintain the UAE’s dependence of outside 
economies to bring money into the emirates. These efforts began to accelerate in the early 
80s and, as will be shown in later chapters, have become key components to the UAE’s 
modern diversification strategy as well. 
Dubai was the earliest and has been the most successful of the emirates in 
expanding its tourism and commercial sector. Beginning in 1989 when Dubai was the first 
to establish a Department of Tourism and Commerce Marketing, Dubai has led the way 
and served as an example for the other emirates in successful commercial and tourist 
growth. Between 1985 and 2000, the number of hotels in Dubai increased from 40 to 300, 
with many of the hotels being high-end luxury hotels that bring in higher revenue and 
maintain higher occupancy rates.82 The increased number of tourists has also served to 
increase revenue from historical sites, museums, resorts, and cultural festivals. 
In the area of commerce, the UAE saw significant increases in the value and volume 
of international trade. Non-oil foreign trade through the ports of Dubai increased 15 fold 
from 1980 to 2001.83 Modern diversification and investment plans have only increased this 
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flow of goods through the UAE. In addition to sheer volume of trade, the level of re-exports 
of goods has increased as well. This re-export activity is an indicator of significantly 
increased commercial activity. Dubai has also become a center of global finance and other 
commerce. 
5. Technology Transfer 
Another aspect of early diversification efforts were programs to reduce reliance on 
foreign companies and to increase local production through the use of technology transfers 
and foreign reinvestment in UAE domestic industries. In the early 1980s, the Chamber of 
Commerce proposed forcing foreign companies to reinvest large shares of revenues back 
into the federation in addition to taxation and other restrictions.84 These initial ideas were 
not implemented; however, a similar arrangement later required foreign firms operating in 
the UAE to invest with local partners in a program managed by an entity called the UAE 
Offsets Group. This program focused heavily on defense firms who would not be otherwise 
utilizing the local workforce and would not provide technology that could be implemented 
in other areas of the domestic economy. The group required that non-arms related ventures 
should yield 60% of the value of arms procurement contracts over seven years. This 
arrangement resulted in a number of joint ventures such as healthcare centers, shipbuilding 
companies, agricultural exports, and a seafood company undertaken by firms such as 
McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin.85 
6. Educational Development 
Although not directly related to economic diversification efforts, the UAE has 
worked to improve in the education and health care sectors in order to provide a more 
capable and healthy workforce able to sustain economic growth and reduce reliance on 
foreign expertise and labor. These areas also go hand in hand with economic success in 
fulfilling the vision of creating a happy society and improving overall quality of life.  
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Beginning with early development plans, the UAE has worked to increase the 
number of schools, teachers, and students. These early efforts saw rapid results, with the 
literacy rate among youth rising to 90% by 2000 and significant increases in enrollment 
and graduation rates of primary and secondary schools.86 Advances in university education 
were not as rapid; however, enrollment rates did increase from nearly zero at the 
establishment of the UAE to around 12% in 1999.87 The first university was established in 
Al-’Ayn 1978, however enrollment and establishment of other universities has continued 
steadily since. These efforts have continued, and the results of these efforts will be looked 
at in forthcoming chapters. 
7. Emiratization 
Another area not directly related to diversification, but critical to early and future 
economic development plans is the program of Emiratization of the workforce. 
Emiratization is the effort to replace the expertise and production of foreign workers with 
local labor. This serves to both provide jobs for the local workforce and reduces 
dependency on outside forces. Efforts at requiring foreign firms to hire local workers can 
be seen as far back as the first oil exploration days in the early twentieth century. Local 
leaders instituted local labor requirements in oil concessions, including the need to train 
locals in the technical aspects of the business.88 
The strategy of Emiratization accelerated in the late 1970s as industries began to 
flourish in the area as a result of the sharp increases in oil revenues. Educational 
development focused on subjects related to professional skills and business practices to fill 
the demand of rapidly growing sectors of the economy.89 In addition to basic education, 
the government instituted training programs and subsidies to encourage full-time 
employment and expand work opportunities. 
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More direct efforts at increasing the percentage of the Emirati workforce were also 
undertaken early on. The government passed labor laws that granted greater rights to local 
workers, including special pension funds and greater protection of workers’ rights. The 
UAE also instituted a sponsorship system, where all foreign business require a local partner 
in order to conduct business. In addition to requiring local partnerships, employment quotas 
have been instituted in some sectors and fines and penalties imposed for the hiring of 
foreign labor.90 Early efforts at Emiratization were widely unsuccessful, requiring the 
continued efforts of an Emiratization strategy. 
The economy of the UAE had changed drastically from its traditional pearling and 
camel herding roots to become a wealthy, oil-based, developed economy. Leaders of the 
UAE recognized early that continued reliance on oil revenues would not be sustainable and 
instituted programs to diversify and industrialize the economy while reducing dependence 
on foreign labor. While these early efforts have seen some success, continued 
diversification and development of the local labor pool is still required. This is why they 
UAE has continued to develop plans to further their development and diversification 
programs. These modern efforts will be looked at in the next chapter.  
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III. UAE VISION 2021 
Nations have increasingly adopted sweeping “Visions” as a blueprint for economic 
and social development. Increasing competition among similar resource-based economies 
has led to the desire to develop and structure their economies and broader society to be in 
position to survive into the future. There is a shared belief in the inevitable inability for 
natural resources to finance the social and economic programs that prop-up the ruling 
governments and provide for popular support going forward.  
The idea of national 5 and ten-year plans are not new, but the implementation of 
these “Visions” in GCC countries began with Oman’s Vision 2020 launched in 1995. The 
Oman Vision set a broad set of economic and social objectives for the next 25 years.91 
Other GCC nations have followed suit, with Vison 2030 in Bahrain, Kuwait Vision 2035, 
Saudi Arabia’s long-term strategy 2025, and Qatar’s Vision 2030.92  
The UAE’s version of a broad vision is encapsulated in its “Vision 2021,” which 
was launched by the vice president and prime minister of the UAE, Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Rashid al Maktoum, in 2010. The goal of the Vision is to make the UAE one of the best 
countries in the world by the 50th anniversary of the UAE’s founding, the Golden Jubilee.93 
The Vision seeks to build upon the work done by the early leaders of the UAE, including 
past national strategies and the National Work Program, and continue to develop the overall 
Emirati society in order to face the challenges of a modern world.94 In order to accomplish 
these goals, the vision lays out four pillars that broadly describe where the government 
wants UAE society to be in 2021.  
Nested under the four broad pillars of the vision are the six national priorities that 
are representative of more specific sectors and make up the National Agenda portion of 
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Vision 2021. Each of these priorities contains a number of indicators for measuring 
progress toward achieving the overall goals espoused in the vision. While the indicators 
are useful, they only provide a snapshot of current status. There are no goals listed or 
demonstration of past performance. This allows the UAE to communicate their aspirations 
without the political pressure of having specific benchmarks to achieve or the fallout that 
can come if they fall short. The overall idea is improvement in each of the indicators and 
identifying ways to quantify the nebulous ideas laid out in the vision. A brief description 
of these pillars and priorities follows, with increased emphasis on the areas related to 
economic diversification efforts. 
A. UNITED IN RESPONSIBILITY 
The first pillar of Vison 2021 is titled “United in Responsibility” and is designed to 
establish a shared idea of how each Emirati contributes to the overall success of society. It 
focuses on responsibility at the individual, family, community, and cultural level. 
Individuals are to find success through a strong work ethic and duty toward the nation. 
Families are seen as the nucleus of society, with an emphasis on maintaining the status of 
elders and reversing the climbing divorce rate. Stronger communities will come from 
increased inclusion, trust, and solidarity among Emirati citizens along with a continued 
emphasis on the Islamic and Arabic cultural heritage of the nation.95  
The national priority under the United in Responsibility pillar is to maintain a 
cohesive society and preserve the national identity of UAE citizens as Arabs with a rich 
traditional heritage. The priority emphasizes the importance of family and the overall goal 
is to have citizens proud of their nation and achieve an overall state of happiness.96 The 
benchmarks utilized to measure progress in this section are social and family cohesion 
indexes created by the Ministry of Community Development, a national identity index 
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created by the UAE University, the number of Olympic and Paralympic medals won, and 
United Nations (UN) happiness and human development indexes.97 
The UAE launched “Cohesive Family 2021” in 2016 as a specific program to help 
improve progress in the social and family cohesiveness indicators.98 A key initiative of the 
program is an online “Family Pledge” form that askes Emiratis to promise to support family 
members and traditions. The goal of the program is to reach 100% in the Family Cohesion 
index by 2021. The index is a composite number that covers relations between parents, 
parents’ relationship to children, and other factors. In 2013, the index reading was 86.4%; 
but by 2017, it had dropped to 75%.99   
B. UNITED IN DESTINY 
“United in Destiny” is the second pillar of the Vision and focuses on maintaining 
the legacy of the nation’s founders and the continued upward trajectory of the nation’s 
development. Maintaining the federation of the various Emirates as well as balance among 
regions is noted as a critical goal. Another component of maintaining the rapid national 
development is maintaining the safety and security of the citizens through good 
governance, a strong judiciary, and social safety nets for the most vulnerable in society.100 
Nested under the United in Destiny pillar is the national priority of creating a safe 
public and fair judiciary. The goal of this priority is to make the UAE the safest place in 
the world. In order to accomplish this goal, the UAE seeks to provide reliable police 
services, increase road safety, emergency preparedness, and overall security.101 The 
importance of a developed and fair legal system is also emphasized, guaranteeing the rights 
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of both individuals and corporations. In order to measure these priorities the agenda uses 
World Economic Forum (WEF) rankings of reliability of security and police services, 
World Bank rankings of judicial system efficiency, and Interior Ministry data on average 
response times, road fatalities, and a measurement of “sense of security.”102 
The achievement of these goals is another key undergirding to the goal of a creating 
diversified economy and attracting foreign investment. The stability and fairness of a 
nation’s judicial system are key aspects of corporations’ decisions about where to operate 
and maintain capital. These legal and safety considerations are also factored into many of 
the economic indices utilized in Vision 2021 to measure economic progress. 
C. UNITED IN KNOWLEDGE 
The third pillar, “United in Knowledge” focuses on the development of a 
knowledge based economy to ensure continued prosperity and move away from oil-based 
resource dependency. Part of this pillar relies on developing and utilizing national human 
capital through increased educational opportunities and training programs suited for the 
modern economy. Utilizing national human capital by increasing the number of Emiratis 
participating in the economy, especially the private sector, is a key component of this pillar. 
This is achieved through various programs of Emiratization of the workforce. Where UAE 
nationals cannot provide needed expertise, the UAE seeks to attract top talent from around 
the globe. The overall goal of the shift to knowledge-based sectors is to create a sustainable 
and diversified economy. This includes increasing entrepreneurship, innovation, and 
foreign investment.103 
The national priority under the United in Knowledge pillar is the development of a 
“Competitive Knowledge Economy.” The goal is to become the economic, tourist, and 
commercial capital of the region.104 In order to accomplish this the UAE seeks to shift 
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further away from a resource-based economy to a knowledge-based economy. Peter 
Drucker originally posited the idea behind a knowledge-based economy in 1966 when he 
predicted that intellectual capabilities would power future economic growth instead of 
physical labor or natural resources.105 The World Bank identified four aspects of a 
knowledge-based economy, global incentives and institutions, innovation and 
technological adoption, first-rate education, and world-class telecommunications 
infrastructure.106 These aspects are each found in the various priorities of Vision 2021 
under different pillars.  
The UAE national agenda puts entrepreneurship in a key position in working 
toward a knowledge-based economy. The plan calls for schools and universities to foster 
an entrepreneurial culture leading to increased innovation and research and development. 
In order to measure progress toward its goal of a diversified and knowledge-based economy 
Vision 2021 utilizes a number of indicators. Some are traditional economic indicators, such 
as non-oil GDP growth, foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, and income per 
capita. Indicators focused on the shift toward knowledge-based sectors and 
entrepreneurship are captured in the percentage of GDP used for research and development 
and the percent of GDP produced by small- and medium-size businesses. Other indicators 
focus on the progress of Emiratization of the workforce in the private sector and the overall 
economy. Finally, the plan utilizes rankings in the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report 
(GCR), INSEAD Business School’s GII, and the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
index to measure comparative progress globally.107 
The UAE government has initiated specific actions to improve in these areas. Some 
of these initiatives are the creation of special economic zones to encourage foreign 
investment, employment incentives in the private sector for hiring Emirati nationals, and 
investment in research and development. Similar to other areas of the National Agenda, 
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there are not precise targets given for the indicators utilized in the Competitive Knowledge 
Economy section. The fourth chapter of this paper will undertake a further discussion of 
some of these indicators, as well as an analysis of performance up to this point. 
D. UNITED IN PROSPERITY 
The final pillar, “United in Prosperity,” covers other improvements toward the 
overall well-being of the Emirati citizen. Improvements in the healthcare sector include 
ensuring access to quality basic medical services and focusing on disease prevention 
through education and better public health and sanitation. Educational goals include 
smaller class sizes, increased enrollment in secondary and tertiary education, and more 
technical and vocational training. Other areas covered under prosperity include sustaining 
the environment, increased cultural and recreational activities, and better and more 
responsive governance. Nested under the United in Prosperity pillar are the national 
priorities of sustainable environment and infrastructure, world-class healthcare, and a first 
rate education system.108 
1. Sustainable Environment and Infrastructure 
The sustainable environment and infrastructure priority seeks to ensure that future 
development preserves the environment and balances economic and social development. 
The environmental goals are to improve air quality, preserve water resources, increase the 
usage of clean energy, and incorporate environmentally sustainable growth. The indicators 
to measure the environmental portion of the plan are the water scarcity index, air quality 
index, percentage of treated waste, and the percentage of clean energy utilized.109 While 
monitoring these indicators can provide insight into environmental progress, the numbers 
are provided without context and do not give any indication as to whether objectives are 
being achieved. This problem is seen in many of the indicators in other areas of the vision 
as well. For example, the percentage of clean energy utilized in 2017 was only 0.54%, 
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which is significantly lower than other modern economies.110 For comparison, the United 
States utilized 11% clean energy in 2017.111 The air quality index is presented as 77%, 
however the air quality index is measured between 0–500, with readings over 100 being 
unhealthy groups.112 There is no explanation as to what the 77% indicates or whether that 
is in line with where the UAE wants to be in terms of air quality. 
The building of world-class infrastructure has been part of UAE diversification 
efforts since its founding in 1971. The government has made significant investments in 
port and airport infrastructure to make the UAE a trading hub and access point for the rest 
of the Middle East.113 The building of infrastructure is critical to the economic development 
and diversification plans outlined in the knowledge economy section of the vision. Having 
world-class ports, airports, roads, electric grid, and telecommunications is necessary to 
attract the foreign investment and commerce envisioned in the economic plans of the 
Emirates. More recent infrastructure building efforts have focused on telecommunications 
infrastructure to support increased modern computer-based industries. The indicators 
utilized to measure infrastructure development are the World Bank’s logistics performance 
index, the UN’s online services index, and infrastructure and telecommunications network 
rankings in the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report.114 The WEF report captures port, 
airport, telecommunications, and overall infrastructure rankings. 
The final portion of sustainable environment and infrastructure is the goal of 
providing suitable housing for all eligible UAE nationals in a reasonable timeframe. This 
is accomplished through the Sheikh Zayed Housing Program, which works through loans 
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and housing development projects to provide adequate housing.115 The indicator utilized 
to measures the success of the program is the time it takes for participants in the program 
to receive a house or a housing loan through the program. In 2017, the wait times were 
3.32 years for a home and 2.76 years for a loan.116 The goal by 2021 is to reduce those 
times to two years. 
2. World-Class Health Care 
The priority of providing world class health care to its citizens encompasses the 
building and upgrading of hospitals as well as national programs aimed at increasing 
preventative medicine and reducing cancer, diabetes, and cardiovascular diseases. The plan 
uses World Health Organization (WHO) statistics such as number of doctors and nurses 
per 1,000 population and average life expectancy as indicators. In addition to WHO 
statistics, the plan utilizes internal statistics from the Ministry of Health and Prevention 
showing the percentage of smokers, childhood obesity, diabetes, and percentage of health 
facilities accredited by the government as benchmarks.117  
Increasing the quality of healthcare in the country is another area that can provide 
tangential benefits in economic diversification. The building of hospitals, training of 
doctors and nurses, and the establishment of health care service businesses is a key 
component of providing economic activity outside of the natural resources sector. It is also 
an economic sector that can employ Emirati nationals who graduate from the improved 
educational system. 
3. First-Rate Education 
The final priority under the United in Prosperity pillar is the building of a first rate 
education system. The improvement of education is another critical component to building 
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a knowledge-based economy and preparing for an economic future less dependent on 
natural resources. The agenda calls for a complete transformation of the education system 
and teaching methods. It also seeks the introduction of Smart systems and electronic 
devices as the basis for new teaching methods. Increased enrollment in preschool, higher 
graduation rates and increased academic performance are overall goals of the effort.118 The 
indicators used to measure this portion of the vision are rankings on the international 
TIMMS math and science test, the PISA math and reading test, graduation rates, 
percentages of schools with high quality teachers, and preschool enrollment among other 
statistics provided by the Ministry of Education. While some of these numbers appear 
promising, such as a 97% graduation rate of upper secondary schools, others, such as the 
quality of teacher indicators, show room for significant improvement.119 
The establishment of an improved education system will serve as the engine for 
future growth in the envisioned knowledge-based economy. Emiratis need to have the 
advanced skills in demand by employers in order to improve the Emiratization rate in the 
private sector. Having a skilled native workforce will also serve as an incentive for 
companies to relocate to, or remain in the UAE to conduct business. Each of the priorities 
work together toward establishing a stronger society and more diverse economy going 
forward. 
E. OTHER STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS 
In addition to the national vision, individual Emirates have created their own 
strategic documents that outline the vision for their portion of the UAE and focus on the 
areas of the Vision 2021 that are most applicable to them. For example, Abu Dhabi still 
maintains the majority of oil reserves in the country and has a different strategic outlook 
than Dubai, which needs to focus more on the financial, tourist, and services sectors. Many 
of these plans build on Vision 2021, but others are rooted in earlier Emirate specific efforts 
that set the precedent for the national Vision. Looking at these plans is useful in providing 
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context for Vision 2021 and in gaining a better understanding of specific goals toward 
which the Emirates are working. 
The first of these Emirate specific plans was Dubai’s Strategic Plan 2015 launched 
in 2007 by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai who also 
launched Vision 2021. The plan is very similar to the national vision that came after it, 
with focus areas of economic development, improved infrastructure and environment, 
safety, security and justice, government excellence and societal development.120 Each of 
these priorities was broken down into subsections and cover education, economic and 
social programs, and better governance. 
The overall goals of Dubai’s 2015 plan reflect what was later incorporated into 
Vision 2021. In contrast to Vision 2021, the plan provided specific benchmarks of this plan 
that could be easily measured and compared to future performance. For example, the plan 
set a goal of sustaining a real GDP growth rate of 11% per year for the next ten years.121 
This projection came on the heels of five years of significant double-digit growth and may 
have seemed attainable at the time. However, during the subsequent ten years there was 
significant global economic unrest and the growth rates ended up much lower, even 
reaching a negative 5.2% growth rate during the 2009 economic crisis.122 
The next Emirate to produce a strategic plan was Abu Dhabi with its Economic 
Vision 2030 launched in 2008. The Economic Vision is one of a series of strategic 
documents leading up to 2030 that also include urban planning and social programs. The 
Economic Vision itself focuses on building a sustainable economy and utilizing a balanced 
economic development approach going forward.123 As the largest oil-producing Emirate, 
Abu Dhabi has relied more heavily on oil than the other Emirates and has utilized its oil 
wealth to fund programs throughout the country. In Economic Vision 2030, there is 
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significant emphasis on fiscal responsibility, labor efficiency, and diversification of 
economic sectors. 
Similar to Dubai’s 2015 plan, Economic Vision 2030 sets specific benchmarks that 
can be measured to see if the plan is succeeding. Economic growth had slowed by the time 
the plan was unveiled and planner scaled back GDP growth targets. Vision 2030 set annual 
growth targets of 7% through 2015 and 6% thereafter. Non-oil GDP growth targets were 
higher, with the idea being that the focus on diversification would lead to a shrinking share 
of GDP from oil. These targets were set at 9.5% until 2015 and 7.5% thereafter.124 Planners 
set other specific targets in the areas of GDP per capita, productivity, and Emiratization of 
the workforce.  
As 2015 approached, Dubai launched a new plan, Dubai Plan 2021, which closely 
aligns to Vision 2021. The six sections of the plan are the economy, government, people, 
society, experience, and place. Each section has aims that describe the vision going forward 
and key performance indicators (KPI) to gauge success. As oppose to Plan 2015 and similar 
to Vision 2021, there are not specific numbers set as goals associated with the KPIs so it is 
difficult to gauge whether they are making satisfactory progress. Perhaps they learned the 
lesson form Plan 2015 when they failed to meet lofty goals and could be pointed to as 
failure. The KPIs for the economy section focus on the trade, financial, and tourism sectors 
that make up Dubai’s economy. Some of these KPIs are GDP growth rate, rankings of port 
and airport volume, rate of foreign direct investment, and tourist numbers.125 
The smaller Emirates also have plans based of Vision 2021 and tailored to their 
specific circumstances. Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah have both developed tourism plans 
that focus on increasing the volume of tourists through development of cultural sites.126 
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Ajman, which has almost zero oil revenue, has a Vision 2021 focused on building a green 
economy and a more cohesive and happy society.127 
Although Vision 2021, the individual Visions of the Emirates, and other strategic 
documents are not exclusively dedicated to economic diversification, almost all aspects of 
the plans work toward achieving that goal. Diversification of the economy is critical in 
order to maintain the level of public services and other benefits that lead to the overall well-
being that is the center of Vision 2021. The next chapter will utilize the performance 
indicators that have been outlined in this chapter and utilize benchmarks outlined in other 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF PROGRESS 
Vision 2021 laid out the future economic and social outlook that UAE leadership 
envisioned in 2010. This chapter will utilize some of the performance indicators specified 
in the Vision along with basic economic performance indicators to determine if the UAE 
has made progress toward their goal of a more diverse and knowledge based economy. 
This chapter will look at annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates, annual non-
oil GDP growth, the Global Innovation Index (GII), and the Global Competitive Index 
(GCI) contained in the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). While not a comprehensive 
study, these key indicators do provide insight into where the UAE has been successful and 
where there is still work to do. 
A. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
GDP has become widely used as a reference point for the overall health of national 
economies. GDP started to become widely used following the Bretton Woods conference 
in 1944 and expanded in use following World War II.128 The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) defines GDP as “the monetary value of final goods and services…produced in a 
country in a given period of time. It counts all of the output generated within the borders 
of a country.”129 Real GDP is calculated by adjusting for inflation and allows for a fair 
comparison year over year. Real GDP is also referred to as GDP in constant prices. Data 
for determining GDP is usually calculated by each nation’s statistical agency, but follow 
standards established by the IMF, the European Commission, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), UN, and the World Bank.130 This 
standardization allows for easier comparison across economies. 
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The authors of UAE Vision 2021 did not establish specific GDP growth goals for 
the years going forward. The Vision described aspirational changes to the makeup of the 
UAE economy, shifting away from resource dependence to a knowledge-based economy 
that could sustain growth without reliance on oil. It also included plans for improving the 
underlying supports of the economy, such as education and infrastructure that would also 
lead to future growth. In order to determine whether those efforts have been successful, we 
must look to establish a reasonable expected GDP growth rate and then compare actual 
results. 
In order to establish what expected GDP growth rate UAE leaders may have 
envisioned in 2010 when Vision 2021 was released, we must look to earlier strategic 
documents as well as the aspirational verbiage contained within Vision 2021. As discussed 
in chapter three of this paper, the two largest and economically most significant of the 
Emirates, Dubai and Abu Dhabi, both created strategic visions prior to Vision 2021. These 
documents, Dubai’s Strategic Plan 2015 and Abu Dhabi’s Economic Vision 2030, 
established quantified benchmarks to gauge the success of the economic proposals within 
the plans. These benchmarks can be useful when looking what a successful GDP for Vision 
2021 would be. 
Dubai’s Strategic Plan was written in 2005 and came at a time of rapid economic 
growth for the country. Dubai had been working on a number of financial reforms and was 
expanding in the tourism and trade sectors. With that in mind, Plan 2015 called for 11% 
annual GDP growth over the following ten years.131 Based on the growth experienced in 
the immediately preceding years, this goal seemed ambitious, but attainable. However, the 
global economic downturn toward the end of the decade took its toll on the GDP growth 
of the UAE, especially in the finance and tourism sectors that had provided previous 
growth. In fact, in 2009 the UAE actually saw GDP contraction of -5.2%.132 
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Abu Dhabi released their Economic Vision 2030 in 2008 and had the advantage of 
seeing some of the early signals of the slowing of the global economy. By the time they 
created their plan, they scaled back growth predictions to 7% annually until 2015 and then 
6% annually thereafter.133 Abu Dhabi is the largest oil producing Emirate and its economy 
is more reliant on oil revenues than Dubai or other Emirates. The transition of the Abu 
Dhabi economy to the growing knowledge based sectors is not as urgent as some of the 
other Emirates due to its oil wealth. The more industrial nature of the economy also leads 
to slower GDP growth. These factors all may account for Abu Dhabi’s more conservative 
growth goals compared to Dubai’s three years earlier. 
So by 2010, what kind of GDP growth expectations did the UAE leadership have? 
The language of Vision 2021 describes a dynamic economy that is rapidly changing to 
meet the needs of the future. Revenues from the traditional natural resource based economy 
would be utilized to rapidly develop new sectors of the economy and lead to rapid growth 
in those areas. According to the IMF, target GDP growth for emerging economies usually 
falls between 5% and 10% annually.134 Although not classified as an emerging economy, 
the UAE’s transition away from resource dependence shares many characteristics of a 
developing economy, with the creation of new economic sectors and associated increases 
in productivity. An estimate of GDP growth within the 5–10% would seem to match the 
aspirations articulated in Vision 2021. Based on these factors this paper will utilize the 
target growth rates of the largest Emirate, as articulated in Abu Dhabi’s vision 2030, as a 
reasonable benchmark for the UAE as a whole. 
Looking at the actual GDP growth rates compared to targets of 7% through 2015 
and 6% thereafter, the UAE has fallen short of expectations. Figure 1 shows that the UAE 
nearly reached target growth rates in 2011 at 6.93% but fell short in each of the other years. 
Growth recovered rapidly following the 2009 global financial crisis, remaining steady 
between 4% and 5% from 2012–2015. However, growth rates following 2015 have been 
especially disappointing, with 2017 growth less than 1%. Some of this slowdown can be 
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attributed to the decrease in oil prices starting in 2014. As of 2014, oil and gas extraction 
still accounted for 34% of the UAE economy and depressed oil prices significantly affected 
revenues.135 This performance only serves to re-emphasize the importance of further 
diversification and reduced reliance on oil for revenue in order to become more resistant 
to price fluctuations in the oil market. 
 
Figure 1. GDP in Constant Prices for the UAE, Annual Percent 
Change136 
B. NON-OIL GDP 
Non-oil GDP growth is listed as one of the KPIs of the competitive knowledge 
economy pillar of the 2021 National Agenda to achieve Vision 2021. Measuring the non-
oil GDP growth rate is a good indication of whether non-oil sectors of the economy, 
especially those in the knowledge-based sectors, are growing. Growth in these areas would 
be an indicator that resources and reform efforts in these areas are paying dividends and 
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helping to diversify the economy away from resource reliance. Some of the non-oil sectors 
that most contribute to the UAE’s GDP are wholesale and retail trade, repair services, real 
estate, business and finance, construction, and manufacturing.137 Much of the construction 
and manufacturing sectors in the UAE are structured to take advantage of the cheap energy 
available due to the abundance of gas and oil and are thus still partially reliant on the energy 
sector. 
This paper will look again at Abu Dhabi’s Economic Vision 2030 in order to 
establish a benchmark for non-oil GDP growth. Dubai’s Plan 2015 did not contain non-oil 
GDP goals because oil only accounts for approximately 1% of Dubai’s GDP and is not 
significant enough to warrant a separate category. Abu Dhabi is more representative of the 
UAE economy as a whole. Non-oil GDP growth should outpace GDP growth in a 
diversifying economy as the economy reduces reliance on natural resources and other 
sectors replace oil revenues. Based on this assumption, non-oil GDP growth targets were 
set at 9.5% annually through 2015 and 7.5% annually thereafter in Vision 2030.138 These 
growth rate targets are 2.5% and 1.5% greater than overall GDP targets and using these 
figures reflect Vision 2021’s aspirations for an increasingly knowledge-based economy 
prepared for future non-resource dependent growth. 
Figure 2 shows that the UAE failed to reach the aspirational growth targets in any 
of the years from 2010–2018. Perhaps more troubling, it also failed to meet the goal of 
having non-oil GDP growth outpace overall GDP growth as would be expected in a 
successfully diversifying economy. Non-oil GDP growth was below overall GDP growth 
in five of the nine years. In 2013 and 2016, non-oil growth was only marginally higher, by 
.9% and .17%, respectively. The year 2014 stands out with non-oil growth 2% higher as 
hoped for in a diversifying economy; however, this can be largely explained by the 
significant drop in oil prices in 2014. With the reduced share of oil revenue, an increase in 
non-oil contribution to the GDP is expected.139 Although growth rates may not be as high 
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has hoped, the fact that non-oil GDP was able to grow during the 2014 downturn is a good 
sign of the strength of other sectors of the economy. Unfortunately, as oil prices remained 
low in subsequent years, non-oil GDP growth slowed as well. 
 
Figure 2. Non-Oil GDP of the UAE in Constant Prices, Annual 
Percent Change140 
C. GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 
The GII was started in 2007 by a professor at the INSEAD business school to better 
measure innovation and go beyond previous basic metrics used such as research and 
development (R&D) spending and academic research articles. The index utilizes the OECD 
definition of innovation, which is “the implementation of a new or significantly improved 
product (good or service), a new process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational 
method in business practices, workplace organization, or external relations.141 Measuring 
innovation outputs is difficult, and few official statistics exist that quantify innovation. To 
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overcome this, the GII emphasizes measuring the climate and infrastructure for innovation 
and assessing outcomes related to that climate. The Index utilizes two equally weighted 
sub-indices consisting of different pillars to provide the overall score for a country. The 
innovation input index consists of five pillars that reflect elements that enable innovation 
and the innovation output sub-index has two pillars showing the results of innovative 
activities. The GII is a good indicator to study in the context of UAE’s Vision 2021 because 
it covers many of the areas that encompassing Vision 2021, including government 
institutions, infrastructure, and human capital, in one place. 
The GII is constantly working to provide the best data possible, and the model used 
to generate scores and rankings are adjusted every year. The sub-indices and major pillars 
have remained consistent with only slight changes in terminology. The sub-pillars and 
indicators under the sub-pillars are adjusted more frequently and each year’s report details 
changes made and the impact of those changes on rankings. Data is updated as available 
and the reports utilize data from prior years if it the most current available. Since 2016, the 
Index tightened the data requirements for inclusion and some countries with multiple fields 
of missing data were dropped.142 These changes make it difficult to compare scores from 
year to year, however since the same framework is utilized for the included countries each 
year, the relative rankings are still useful when comparing across economies and looking 
for general trends. 
Institutions is the first pillar of the input sub-index. The institutions pillar includes 
the sub-pillars of the political environment, regulatory environment, and business 
environment. Indices used to score these areas cover the political stability of governments, 
quality of public services, government policies toward the private sector, rule of law, and 
ease of doing business.143 These correlate to goals laid out in the Safe Public and Fair 
Judiciary and Cohesive Society and Preserved Identity national priorities in Vision 2021.   
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The second pillar of the Input sub-index is human capital and research. The sub-
pillars are education, tertiary education, and research and development. The indicators used 
to measure in this pillar cover elementary and secondary education levels, education 
expenditures, OECD PISA scores, tertiary enrollment focusing on STEM, number or 
researchers, money spent on R&D, and the quality of research universities in the country.144 
These indicator correlate to the goals in the First-Rate Education System and elements of 
the Completive Knowledge Economy priorities of Vision 2021. 
Infrastructure makes up the third pillar of the input sub-index and includes the sub-
pillars of information and communication technologies (ICT), general infrastructure, and 
ecological sustainability. These sub-pillars use ICT indices, online participation, electricity 
output, logistics performance, capital improvement outlays, and energy efficiency to score 
the infrastructure pillar.145 Vision 2021 covers these elements in the sustainable 
environment and infrastructure section. 
The fourth pillar of market sophistication covers credit, investment, and trade. To 
measure these sub-pillars the Index looks at ease of credit, bankruptcy laws, volume of 
credit, protection for minority investors, market size and dynamism, tariffs, competition, 
and GDP.146 The competitive knowledge economy section of Vision 2021 covers many of 
these areas, but infrastructure development have been parts of the UAEs economic plans 
for decades.  
The final pillar of the input sub-index is business sophistication. This pillar attempts 
to capture the conditions within business that foster innovation. The sub-pillars in this area 
are knowledge workers, innovation linkages, and the absorption of knowledge. In order to 
measure these areas the GII uses R&D expenditures within business, the number of 
knowledge workers, number of employees with advanced degrees, collaboration between 
universities and business, multi-party patents, trade levels, and intellectual property and 
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technology imports.147 These measurements all fit with the competitive knowledge 
economy portion of Vision 2021 and are areas where the UAE has sought improvement. 
The innovation output sub-index only has two associated pillars. The first pillar, 
knowledge and technology outputs, covers variables associated with inventions or 
innovations. It covers national and international patents, peer-reviewed published articles, 
increases in labor productivity, high-tech industrial output, high-tech exports, and exports 
of ICT services. The second output pillar is creative outputs. This covers trademarks 
applications, industrial designs, cultural exports, online presence and proliferation of 
mobile apps. Cultural exports include marketing, films, music, and other exportable 
creative intellectual property. These measurements attempt to capture the results of 
inventive or innovative activity. If innovation inputs are being implemented or improved, 
the outputs should rise correspondingly.  
The UAE has had mixed performance in the GII since 2010. Due to the 
methodology of the index, year-to-year comparison of raw scores does not provide accurate 
insight. However, since the UAE is competing with other GCC countries in a race to who 
can diversify and reduce reliance on natural resources the fastest, a comparison with other 
GCC countries is appropriate. Figure 3 shows that the UAE has performed well relative to 
other GCC countries in the overall rankings of the index. The UAE has been either the first 
or the second ranked country among the GCC, topping the group in six of the nine years, 
including the last three. This performance would indicate that the UAE is in a good position 
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Figure 3. GII Rankings of GCC Countries 2010–2018148 
Looking closer at the GII reveals area where the UAE is particularly strong, and 
many of these areas are specific efforts of Vision 2021. The UAE performs well in many 
of the areas of the innovation input sub-index, where government policy and resources can 
be directed to influence performance. Particular high points in the most recent report are 
the UAE’s electric infrastructure output (ranked eighth overall), inbound mobility to 
tertiary education (first), and cluster development (second).149  
The electric infrastructure output ranking is helped by the abundance of cheap gas 
available; however, the other areas are direct results of programs implemented in order to 
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improve diversification. Pushes for increased tertiary educational availability and 
opportunity have made tertiary education attainable for almost all UAE citizens who want 
it. These schools are also increasingly graduating students in science and engineering 
curriculums.150 The cluster development are a result of special economic zones established 
to concentrate business together and take advantage of supply chain efficiencies and 
technology sharing.151  
While the GII shows that the UAE is putting effort into the inputs that should lead 
to increased innovation, the result of the innovation output sub-index is less flattering. The 
GII shows that the UAE consistently ranks near the bottom of the approximately 140 
countries covered by the GII in scientific outputs such as scientific and technical articles, 
high-tech exports (excluding re-exports), and patent applications. 
The result of this discrepancy between high rankings in inputs and low rankings in 
outputs is a dismal ranking in the innovation efficiency ratio. This means that the UAE is 
not reaping the rewards of the massive investment they are putting into innovation 
generating sectors. Between 2011 and 2018 the UAE never finished higher ranked than 
95th (2018) and finished as low as 133rd (2013 and 2015) in innovation efficiency.152 It may 
just be a matter of allowing the investments time to result in increased innovative output, 
and their highest efficiency ratio being in 2018 may offer some hope. However, the 
inability to produce innovative output may be a sign that current efforts are not working as 
well as anticipated. 
D. GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 
The GCR is produced annually by the WEF. It ranks countries based on the GCI 
and attempts to measure the ability of economies to use available resources productively 
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in order to sustain current prosperity and create medium-term economic growth.153 The 
GCI is made up of twelve pillars, separated into three sub-indices that are weighted based 
on an economy’s level of development. Data for the index comes from publically available 
economic data and results from the Executive Opinion Survey, which compiles results from 
over 16,000 business executives in over 140 economies.154 The GCI is another index that 
compiles data on many sectors outlined in UAE Vision 2021. Looking at the UAE’s 
performance in the index over time provides insight into the effectiveness of economic 
initiatives undertaken as part of the vision. The GCR changed the way it calculates the GCI 
and the factors that go into the calculation in 2018. This paper will primarily look at reports 
from 2010–2017 In order to make analysis of year-to-year index results consistent. 
The three sub-indices of the GCI are based on the economic theory of stages of 
development. As described in the GCR, the first stage of development is factor-driven and 
economies in this stage rely on unskilled labor and natural resources. This first stage relies 
on well-functioning institutions, stable macroeconomic environment and a relatively 
healthy and educated population. A country moves into the second, efficiency-driven stage 
of development as productivity and wages rise. This stage requires more efficient 
production process and increased quality. This stage requires higher education, developed 
labor and financial markets, integration of technology, and large domestic or export 
markets. The final stage, innovation-driven economy, requires sophisticated business and 
production process and the innovation of new processes to sustain higher wages and a 
higher standard of living.155 
The GCI weighs the scores of the pillars that fall under each of three sub-indices 
that represent the stages of economies based on the stage of development of a particular 
economy. For example, basic factors such as public and private institutions compose 60% 
of the GCI score for economies in the factor driven stage, but only 20% for economies in 
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the innovation driven stage.156 Conversely, innovation and sophistication factors compose 
30% of the score for innovation driven economies and only 5% for factor driven 
economies. The GCI also accounts for economies in transition from one stage to another, 
resulting in five categories that an economy can fall into. The UAE is categorized as an 
innovation driven economy for purposes of the GCI and is the only GCC country to be at 
that advanced stage. The other highest-ranking GCC countries in the index, Saudi Arabia 
and Oman, fall into the category of economies transitioning from efficiency driven to 
innovation driven. 
The first sub-index of basic requirements contains the pillars of institutions, 
infrastructure, macroeconomic environment and health and primary education. The 
institutions pillar looks at both public and private institutions, legal framework, ethics, and 
security. The infrastructure pillar measures quality of roads, railroads, ports, airports, 
electric grid, and telecommunications. The macroeconomic environment is measured by 
looking at government budgets, debts, inflation, and national credit rating. The final basic 
pillar looks at health factors such as prevalence of communicable diseases, life expectancy, 
and infant mortality, as well as the quality and enrollment rate of primary education.157 
Many of Vision 2021’s initiatives are focused on improving in these areas and are reflected 
in the world-class healthcare, first-rate education, sustainable environment and 
infrastructure, and safe public and fair judiciary national priorities.  
The efficiency sub-index is comprised of the higher education and training, goods 
market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market development, technological 
readiness, and market size pillars. Higher education and training looks at the enrollment in 
secondary and tertiary education and education quality. The goods market efficacy pillar 
looks at competition, taxation, ease of starting a new business, tariffs, foreign ownership, 
customs, and demand conditions. Labor market efficiency is measured by the ease of hiring 
and firing employees, pay rates, attraction and retention of talent, and female participation 
in the labor force. The financial market development incorporates the ease of access to 
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financing and capital, soundness of banks, and financial regulations. Technological 
readiness measures the availability of technology, level of technology transfer, and Internet 
usage in a country. The final efficiency pillar accounts for the domestic and foreign market 
available for trade. These areas are incorporated into the knowledge driven economy and 
first-rate education sections of UAE Vision 2021. 
The final GCI sub-index of innovation and sophistication is made up of a business 
sophistication pillar and a R&D innovation pillar. Business sophistication looks at 
competitive advantage, cluster development, value chains, marketing, and the reliance on 
professional management. R&D innovation looks at scientific research institutions, R&D 
spending, patent applications, and protection of intellectual property. Many of these same 
indicators are reflected in the GII, but in the GCI, they are nested with broader economic 
data to form a more complete economic picture. Elements of the competitive knowledge 
economy section of Vision 2021 are reflected in this sub-index. 
The UAE has had consistently high performance in the GCI since 2010, performing 
well relative to other GCC countries and showing steady improvement in overall score. It 
has ranked in the top 20 from 2013–2017. Figure 4 shows the rankings of GCC countries 
in the GCI, with the UAE holding the top spot for the last three years. The closest GCC 
competitors are Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which were also the closest countries in the GCI.  
49 
 
Figure 4. GCI Rankings of GCC Countries 2010–2018158 
The GCI methodology is more consistent than the GII, so year by year comparisons 
of scores is a viable way of looking at absolute improvement in the overall index score as 
well as individual components various areas of the index. The UAE’s overall score (on a 
1–7 scale) improved from 4.9 in 2010 to 5.3 in 2017. There has also been improvement in 
each individual sub-index, with the largest increase in the innovation and sophistication 
factors. This indicates that progress is being made across the board and programs 
implemented to improve the economic environment are having some effect. 
The highest scoring areas for the UAE in the 2017 report are the basic requirement 
sub-pillars of institutions (ranked fifth) and infrastructure (fifth) and the efficiency 
enhancer sub-pillar of goods market efficiency (third). Within those sub-pillars the 
strongest areas are public trust in politicians (second), efficiency in public spending (first), 
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burden of government regulation (second), quality of roads, (first), ports (fourth) and 
airports (third), and the effect of taxation on investment (first).159  Similar to the strengths 
in the GII, these are all areas where government policy or investment has had a positive 
impact on economic factors that lead to diversification and economic growth. 
The pillars where the UAE received lower rankings were the health and primary 
education (33rd) and higher education (36th). The individual areas that received the lowest 
rankings were female participation in the labor force (121st), legal rights index (106th), 
primary and tertiary enrollment rates (87th and 94th) and the government budget balance 
(87th).160 This shows that there is work to do to improve development in the indigenous 
labor force. If these areas are not improved, there will not be sufficient Emirati labor to fill 
the newly created knowledge economy jobs and Emiratization programs in the private 
sector will fail. Either companies will continue to attract foreign talent to fill positions or 
increased government quotas of unqualified Emiratis will cause inefficiencies that will 
stifle growth. 
In 2018, the WEF changed the way it calculated the GCI and came out with GCI 
4.0. This new calculation established different sub-indexes and pillars and removed the 
weighted nature of the sub-indexes based on the stages of economic development. The new 
scores are based on a 100-point scale, with 100 being the optimal condition for 
competitiveness.161 Under the new scoring system, the UAE dropped ten spots to 27th in 
the rankings, but maintained their position atop other GCC countries.162 The pattern of high 
and low ranked areas remained consistent, with top rankings in electricity generation and 
macroeconomic stability and low rankings in health, education, and female labor 
participation. New indicators that also led to poorer performance were freedom of the press 
(104th) and worker’s rights (116th).163 The new scoring system shows that there remains 
room for improvement in the areas of education and innovation. It is again a question of 
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whether the investments and initiatives of the government just need time to show results 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The UAE is considered a rising economic player and has worked to increase its 
relevance on the global stage. Part of that work includes a push toward a competitive, 
diverse economy that leverages the competitive advantage of abundant natural resource 
wealth. This thesis has examined the UAE’s economic vision for the future and evaluated 
the amount of progress that has been made toward achieving that vision. The leaders of the 
UAE understand the need to transition away from resource based revenue and have 
envisioned a plan to do so. However, historical reliance on rent-based revenue and slowly 
developing education sector have limited the ability for Emiratis to generate the economic 
output that would be expected given the investment the government has made. 
The economic and political history of the UAE goes back to the nomadic tribes of 
sheep and camel herding. As pealing became a lucrative commodity trade, the wealth and 
power structure of the nomadic tribes transferred to the pearling industry. Power and status 
were further entrenched by the arrival of external global economic forces, and tribal leaders 
were able to maintain their positions based on receiving rent from trade, land use, and 
eventually oil. Early leadership of the UAE realized it would need to diversify the economy 
to be less reliant on oil revenue when they became independent in 1971. Early 
diversification efforts focused on industrialization, many related or reliant on the oil and 
gas trade, and building infrastructure projects to support these industries. In the most recent 
decades, these diversification efforts have expanded to include more sectors such as 
finance, tourism, and trade. 
In 2010, the UAE launched Vision 2021 as its latest roadmap for the advancement 
of Emirati society and the diversification and expansion of its economy. This plan lays out 
the goal of becoming a knowledge-based economy, and building the educational 
foundation and necessary infrastructure to make that goal a reality. The overall objective 
was to make the UAE the best country in the world by the 50th anniversary of its founding. 
This thesis examined the various parts of the Vision, to include plans for improved 
secondary and tertiary educational outcomes, improved ICT infrastructure, and increased 
innovation and entrepreneurship in knowledge based sectors. While the vision I noble, 
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there is a lack of exact initiatives implemented or specific goals to measure whether 
progress is being made at the pace the leaders had hoped. 
By looking at past strategic visions and by interpreting the verbiage of UAE Vision 
2021, this thesis looked at four different indicators to gauge the success of Vision 2021 up 
to this point. GDP and non-oil GDP growth numbers have not reached the levels expected 
of an economy growing into new, higher productivity sectors. They have also not reached 
the levels that the aspirational language of Vision 2021 would indicate the UAE would like 
to see. The UAE performs well when compared to regional rivals in both the GII and GCI 
indices. It has also made forward progress year over year in the areas measured by both 
reports. However, analysis of the reports shows that the UAE is not creating the type of 
innovative or economic output expected given the large amount of investment into 
infrastructure, education, and government institutions. 
This thesis provided an analysis of current progress toward Vision 2021’s economic 
goals. Further research into the causes of the lower than expected economic gains would 
be useful in directing future efforts toward more productive directions. Further research is 
also needed to determine whether economic gains made to this point will be sustainable as 
the UAE attempts to replace more foreign experts with Emiratis workers and transition 
Emiratis from the public to the private sector. A study of the success of Emiratization 
programs and the economic performance of sectors as they transition would provide insight 
into the long-term viability of the knowledge-based economy toward which the UAE is 
working. 
The UAE has laid the foundation to achieve the kind of economy described in 
Vision 2021. Oil revenues have allowed the government to build infrastructure and 
government institutions that create an environment for successful innovation and economic 
growth. The only part of the equation that is missing is the indigenous labor force educated, 
trained, and motivated to take advantage of the situation. Continued advancement in the 
education of Emirati citizens, increased participation of women in the labor force, and 
decreased dependence on public sector jobs is required to fulfill the vision outlined by UAE 
leaders. It is critical that the UAE moves in this direction while the oil revenues that have 
propped up the economy until now are still around. Future years may see the return from 
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the significant investments made in the knowledge economy up until this point, but there 
will be significant social and economic consequences if the oil revenues that have 
undergirded the UAE power structure disappear in the near future. The UAE is on the right 
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